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MILITARISM— BACKBONE OF MAOISM

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Once a semi-colonial country, China has undergone tremendous changes since the historic victory of October 1, 1949. The revolutionary movement that had been gaining momentum for many decades culminated in the establishment of a new state which chose the socialist path of development.

Riding on the powerful tide of the liberation movement and civil wars Mao Tse-tung rose to the top and became leader of the Party and head of state. For many years his fame was great; people not only in China but in other countries respected and even worshipped him. Yet, Mao's prestige as an outstanding revolutionary burst like a soap-bubble. He now appears as a colossal though refined militarist who rules over China, one who has used the great gains of the Chinese people for his own ends and turned the state against them. During the last three years Mao with a handful of his stooges has succeeded in accomplishing what is virtually a counter-revolutionary coup in the country under the mask of a democratic movement — the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" — whose supposed aim is further to develop the revolution and

consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat. As a result, the danger arises that the country may run off the socialist rails, to the delight of international imperialism.

Marxism-Leninism, the mighty weapon without which no revolutionary success can be achieved in modern time, has been completely ignored by the Mao group. Mao has substituted for Marxist-Leninist teaching his own speculative pseudo-Marxist ideas. A monstrous propaganda machine set up and controlled by the Maoists spares neither time nor effort in trying to poison people's consciousness with Mao's ideas and export them under the label of the "most progressive" ideological trend of our epoch.

I

Militarism, i. e., the reactionary policy of planning and preparing for predatory wars and establishing military rule inside the country, is the basis of Maoism. The latter is an offshoot of the Chinese militarist tradition whose characteristic feature was the consolidation of both military and civil power in the hands of military bureaucrats who pursued a policy based on absolutism and territorial expansion.

Mao's thought is an expression of petty-bourgeois revolutionary mentality, anarchism and political adventurism; the constructive element in it is insignificant and secondary to the destructive, embodied in such Maoist sayings as: "To straighten anything, you must first bend it." Armed struggle and intimidation through the use of force are considered chief means for realizing political ends: "power comes from the barrel of a

gun," "with a gun one can achieve everything," etc. The entire system of Mao's views may be regarded as a justification of violence and destruction, of rioting and war.

The history of feudal China which is filled with military ventures and internecine wars for the imperial throne, the chauvinism of the Hans and conquests of neighbouring peoples lie behind Mao's militaristic ideology. Mao delights in recalling the feats of arms by emperors, kings and war lords of ancient China. In this work Mao cites them as examples to be followed and uses them to justify his own militaristic policy and bellicose utterances. He makes no mention, however, of the hardships and misfortunes which the Chinese people had had to suffer owing to the militaristic rule and ventures of emperors and feudal lords.

The militarist basis of Mao's thinking is clearly shown in his article *Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary War* (1936). The article is about military strategies in ancient China, particularly the views of military strategist Sun Wu Tzu (5th century B. C.). Mao cites episodes from the internecine war between the feudal kingdoms of Lu and Tzi (7th century B. C.); praises the deeds of Generals Hsieh Hsuan and Fu Chian (4th century A. D.), and Lui Pei and Lu Sun (3rd century A. D.); pays tribute to Liu Hsiu who in 23 A. D. with 8-9 thousand troops defeated the 400-thousand-strong army of Wang Mang and became emperor; Mao shows admiration for the methods of warfare used by Ts'ao Ts'ao against Yuan Shao and those of Sun Chuan against Ts'ao Ts'ao (2nd century A. D.). He also

refers to battles and fights from the novel *The Water Margin* (14th century).

In another article *Strategic Problems in the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla War* (1938), Mao talks about the siege of the Wei kingdom in 353 B. C. In *On the Protracted War* Mao condemns the military blunders committed by General Hsiang Kung in 638 B. C. and hails the victory of Han Hsin in 204 B. C. In almost all of his theoretical works Mao invariably pays tribute to warrior-kings, pretenders, leaders of peasant rebellions and various mutinies of the early feudal period. An unbiased reader will quickly notice that almost all of Mao's four-volume selected works are devoted to the subject of war and armed struggle. Even those works which Mao's followers classify as Mao's philosophical writings are full of words like "war" and "army" and of references to military matters—more than two dozens of such references are found in *On Contradictions*, up to two dozens in *On New Democracy* and up to a dozen in *Talks at the Yenan Forum on Art and Literature*. Three of his short articles, *Serve the People*, *In the Memory of Norman Bethune* and *How Yu Kung Removed the Mountains*, used during the "Cultural Revolution" as a gospel from the hands of the "Great Helmsman," also deal with the war theme. Thus Mao the theorist has revealed himself as an apostle of Chinese militarism—from that of the time of Ch'in-Shih-Huang-Ti, the first emperor of China, to that of modern warlords Yuan Shih-kai and Chiang Kai-shek. Incidentally, Mao has never regarded the latter as a class and ideological enemy, always speaking of him as a military rival.

As the leader of the Chinese Communist Party over a period of more than 40 years Mao Tse-tung has always regarded armed struggle as the chief means of revolutionary struggle. He showed great reluctance in forming a united national front with the Kuomintang when such a front would help the Communists in their fight against northern militarists and later against the Japanese aggressors.

In heated debates within the Chinese Communist leadership on the direction which the revolution should take at different stages of the struggle against the Kuomintang, and especially during the 1945 Chungking talks and the peace negotiations in April 1949, Mao emerged as a strong opponent to talks and peace agreements. In 1950, when the country set about rehabilitating her economy and building socialism, the government acting on Mao's instructions undertook war-like preparations in the Taiwan Strait. The emergency situation thus created was immediately seized by the United States as a pretext for unleashing an aggressive war against Taiwan and Korea, a war that inflicted on China heavy casualties and huge material damage. In 1951-52 Peking resorted to military methods, though there was no manifest need for such methods, in suppressing the counter-revolutionaries in the countryside in the South. At times the military operations almost reached the scale of a civil war.

In the years of China's first and only five-year plan (1953-57), when the country experienced an unprecedented economic upsurge thanks to the technical and scientific assistance of the USSR and the other socialist countries, Mao's militaristic and nationalistic policy encountered strong

opposition in the Communist Party. The 8th Party Congress in 1956 adopted important resolutions on furthering socialist construction in China.

Mao Tse-tung, however, soon succeeded in overturning these resolutions and installed himself in power more firmly. It was at this period that the pernicious policies of "People's Communes" and the "Big Leap" were proclaimed. The setting-up of the "communes" was designed to force the peasants into big militarized co-ops while the "Leap" was a primitive attempt to raise the country's military and economic levels. The new course pursued by Mao and his followers also led to orders to start shelling the offshore islands of Chin-men (Quemoy) and Matsu occupied by Chiang Kai-shek in the Taiwan Strait which was and still is under the control of the US 7th Fleet. Guided by the adventurist strategy of "killing several birds with one stone" the Maoists sought to provoke a conflict between the USA and the USSR that might lead to a new world war.

Peking carried out pre-planned military operations in Tibet on the eve of the 10th anniversary of the founding of the Republic. It provoked a border war with India. The Maoists have always kept a lookout for excuses for aggravating international tensions in order to create the illusion that the People's Republic of China is being threatened from outside. In this we see the militaristic philosophy of their leader put to practice. Mao has said: "The state always perishes if it is not threatened from outside"; "We must work as if a war may start tomorrow."

The hegemonistic nature of Mao's global strategy became clear in the early sixties. This stra-

tegy consists in provoking conflicts in various parts of the world and above all between the USSR and the USA. With this end in view Peking has been spreading the idea that a Soviet-American plot is allegedly under way against China. With arrogant disregard for world public opinion China has conducted nuclear weapons tests and is carrying out a policy of inciting local wars in Asia and Africa, of creating more vietnams.

In 1956 Mao's militarism took the guise of the broadly advertised and high-sounding concept of "people's war." The nature and aims of such war have been revealed not only in the foreign policy of the Maoists but also in their home policy, notably in the "Cultural Revolution." The latter is a logical outcome of Mao's policies aimed at subverting the democratic movement and the Communist Party of China, policies which he had been secretly conducting for many years out of selfish motives.

A closer examination of Mao's political and military activities shows that at no time had Mao actually headed the revolutionary movement in China and that he was rather an onlooker pre-occupied with the thought of how to impose on the movement his own doctrines and militaristic aspirations. Mao had consistently attacked the political line of the Communist Party Central Committee and outstanding Chinese revolutionaries. He accused the latter of being anti-patriotic, treacherous, betraying the revolutionary cause and sympathetic to the Soviet Union. After seizing power Mao made short work of them with the help of his henchmen and hangmen among whom is the notorious K'ang Sheng, now one of

the top five in the Chinese leadership, i. e., a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. K'ang Sheng is Mao's eyes, ears and blood — stained axe, his time-tested informer, stool pigeon and bodyguard who enjoys unlimited powers in persecuting real and suspected political opponents of Mao.

Though a member of the Communist Party Central Committee Mao Tse-tung actually took no part in the 1925-27 anti-imperialist and anti-feudal revolution. No wonder he all but disregarded this period in his writings except stressing the shortcomings of that revolution; on the tremendous importance which that revolution had had for the subsequent development and final victory of the Chinese Revolution, Mao had nothing to say at all. Indeed, if one is to take seriously Mao's historiographical interpretations, one would think that it was not Shanghai and Canton that were the starting points of the revolutionary process that culminated in the 1949 victory, but Hunan province and the Ching-kang Mountains where Mao Tse-tung worked out his concept of "the peasants' way to socialism" toward the end of the 1925-27 revolutionary period.

The inaccessible Ching-kang Mountains have been proclaimed a holy place by the Maoists. This is not surprising, for it was there that glory and fame came to Mao Tse-tung as a military leader. According to official claims today, there was located Mao's first stronghold; there Mao began building up the Chinese Red Army. But these claims are entirely groundless.

The fact is that it was not the participants

in the Autumn Harvest Uprising led by Mao — a motley rabble routed by the Kuomintang — that constituted the backbone of the troops in Chinggang, but a 2,000-strong unit of regular revolutionary army led by Chu Te which moved to the mountainous area much later — in the spring of 1928 following the Nanchang Uprising. Chinese Red Army units were formed not only in Chinggang but in many other places in revolutionary China. The real founders of the first Red Army units in China were Chu Te, Yeh Ting, P'eng Pai, Su Chao-cheng, P'eng Te-huai, Ho Lung, Hsü Hsiang-sh'ien and other revolutionaries of the time.

The key point in Mao's strategy is said to be the maintenance of strongholds scattered in various border regions of the provinces. In his work *The Struggle in the Chinggang Mountains* Mao pointed to the advantages of building up bases along the borders. This, however, was not a "discovery," but rather something Mao borrowed from the tactics employed by rival feudal lords in ancient China who paid little attention to what was happening in remote inaccessible areas. These areas were the hiding places of rebellious anti-feudal elements and bands of robbers who threatened the neighbours rather than the feudal lords themselves. In some ways the early Chinese militarists even welcomed the fact that there existed constant threat against the neighbouring provinces, and often when they suffered defeat in internecine wars they themselves sought refuge in border regions in order to recoup their strength. Thus in choosing the Chinggang Mountains situated at the junction of Hunan, Kwangtung and Kiangsi provinces Mao was merely

following the examples set by early Chinese militarists.

In *The Struggle in the Chinggang Mountains* much space is devoted to military tactics. It was then that Mao's tactics of guerrilla warfare were developed whose principles, formulated later, consist in the following: "When the enemy advances, we retreat; when the enemy halts, we harass; when the enemy is exhausted, we strike; when the enemy retreats, we pursue." Though such tactics obviously can be applied only in the conditions of inaccessible mountainous areas Mao's trusted stooge Lin Piao has hailed it as Mao's "theoretical discovery." Lin claimed that the victory of the Chinese Revolution was made possible by application of this Maoist "military doctrine" and that this doctrine was of universal significance for the "people's war" conducted anywhere.

Actually, the flying columns contributed little to the revolution. This is also true of operations carried out in the Chinggang Mountains region; from these operations the Maoists derived a purely militaristic conclusion, namely that revolutionary problems are to be solved with the help of a gun. Now, a stronghold in the wild and desert mountains had no contact with the Chinese village. Thus, whenever the flying columns came to a village the peasants regarded them with distrust, as peasants generally would regard any militarists. Mao himself admitted that "wherever the Red Army goes, it finds the masses cold and reserved" (*Sel. Works*, Vol. 1, p. 99, London, 1954). The peasants near Chinggang were far from being pleased with the hit-and-run tactics of Mao's detachments. They were reluctant to take part in the revolution fearing reprisals by

the reactionaries after the guerrilla detachments had fled. The stronghold in Chingkang was ultimately attacked, and Mao's detachments were forced to flee to the Shensi province and settle in another stronghold there built beforehand this time in the countryside.

In 1929-34 Mao and his followers carried out subversive activities against the Communist Party Central Committee in an attempt to establish their domination in the Central Soviet region in the Kiangsi province. They did not alter their strategy. Lin Piao planned mobile operations for the sole purpose of preserving the troops at Mao's disposal. Such mobile warfare only succeeded in impeding the implementation of agrarian reform. The peasants became disillusioned and feared punitive expeditions by Chiang Kai-shek. Again the revolution suffered defeat. The main forces then made a long retreat, the so-called Long March, to the southwest.

It is not surprising that Mao seldom recalls that period in which he was forced to take part in establishing Chinese Soviets and uphold the policy of alliance of the working class and the peasantry in his speeches and newspaper articles. Indeed, there is not a word in his *Selected Works* about that 6-year period. And when editing his *Selected works* for republication after 1949, Mao stroke out such phrases as "Soviets in China," "Soviet bases," "Soviet power," and "Soviet movement." But the developments connected with this Soviet period were of a deeply national character and of great historical importance. Enjoying tremendous popularity among the people the Chinese Soviets were a revolutionary bea-

con that cannot be erased from the memory of veteran-revolutionaries.

Finding himself in the largest contingent in the "Long March," made up mostly of his followers from Ching kang, Mao undertook decisive steps towards seizing power in the Army and Party. Exploiting the rising revolutionary sentiment in the large province of Szechwan he arranged the so-called Enlarged Meeting of the Central Committee Political Bureau in Tsun-i, in the neighbouring province of Kweichow, with the aim of using the victory in Szechwan to realize his long-cherished plan of seizing power in China.

The meeting in Tsun-i (January 1935) had no quorum to make its decisions valid and was attended mainly by militarists. To this day the Maoists have not made public a single document that would throw light on the work of this separatist meeting. Yet following the meeting Mao emerged as the first leader of the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese Red Army. From this time on he relied solely on the army, making it the basis of the Communist Party of China and completely rejecting Party work in big towns—the country's proletarian centres.

In 1935 Chiang Kai-shek again made Maoists retreat, this time to the North, towards the Mongolian People's Republic and the USSR. Mao rejected the suggestion of Chang Kuo-tao and other leaders that they continue the struggle in the densely populated areas; with part of his troops he resumed the "Long March" through snow-covered mountains and deserts, where he lost most of his people. Only a small group of hungry and ragged people managed to reach the stronghold in the Shensi province established

earlier by Liu Chin-tan, Kao Kang and other revolutionaries. In conformity with his strategy of setting up strongholds in the border areas between provinces Mao built his base on a semi-desert plateau in the Shensi-Kangsi-Ningsia border region.

Within ten years of the so-called Yunnan period this border region became the ideal spot for the new Chinese militarism. It is not accidental that even today the Maoists are holding up the Yunnan examples in the political, economical and cultural spheres. What characterized the Yunnan period were: a militarized society, military discipline, cult of the leader, asceticism, merciless purges, violence and destruction, etc. Meanwhile, no systematic struggle against Japanese troops was waged. Mao stayed in his fortress watching from afar the nation-wide struggle against the Japanese invaders.

Real opportunities opened before the Maoists after the rout of the Kwangtung army by the Soviet Army and the capitulation of Japan, when numerous professional workers and troops of the Chinese People's Liberation Army arrived in the North-Eastern and Northern regions of the country (See Mao Tse-tung, *Sel. Works*, Peking, 1967, Vol. 4, pp. 93-98, *Creating Strongholds in the North-East*).

Relying on Soviet assistance to the Chinese people in their struggle for the country's liberation and claiming credit for the victory over Japan, Mao started a struggle against the hated Chiang Kai-shek regime, a struggle which proved successful. And in this way Mao became a prominent political leader.

II

Militarism underlies the entire policy of Mao Tse-tung and his group. To establish a military dictatorship the Maoists carried out a process of militarizing the country's economy, political and social life. Inasmuch as such a process is incompatible with the very nature of a socialist state and with the Communist Party programme, the Maoists took steps towards abolishing the socialist superstructure and eventually liquidating the Marxist Communist Party.

These steps could not but encounter strong opposition by true Communists and patriots at all levels of party leadership and state power. However, counter-revolutionary Maoism resorted to its main weapon -- the Army, which had been prepared well in advance for fighting down any opposition.

The preparations were started at the same time that the "Big Leap" and "People's Communes" were organized. Lin Piao was appointed Minister of Defence instead of P'eng Te-huai who had condemned the "Leap" and the setting-up of "Communes" and called for the building of modern armed forces. It was then that the number of political instructors in the Army was increased, and old cadres were ousted and replaced from top to bottom by trusted Maoists. Lin Piao came out in the press with a solemn pledge of loyalty to Mao, which was a kind of an oath of allegiance to the leader. It was also then that a small booklet with a red cover *The Thought of Chairman Mao* first appeared in the Army with a preface written by Lin Piao. Later, *The Thought* in an enlarged edition became a prayer-book for

hungweipings (Red Guards) and flooded China and a number of other countries.

The entire propaganda machine was set into motion. The Maoists forced the newspaper *Jen-min jihpao* of the Communist Party Central Committee to reprint editorials from the Army newspaper *Tsefang thunpao* whose theme-song was Mao's saying: "The entire country learns from the Army; people are soldiers."

The failure of the "Big Leap" and "People's Communes" complicated Maoist plans. In the period of "adjustment" of the national economy that followed, more sober-minded state and party leaders took charge of the country's economic and social life. Mao had to pretend, during this period, that he was being preoccupied with theoretical research. It is common knowledge that from autumn 1965 until spring 1966 Mao but all disappeared from the political scene. However, he was not idle; he was working out plans for seizing power while his followers were preparing to carry them out. With the help of his closest military associates Mao once again succeeded in getting power into his hands and began taking vengeance on his political opponents.

On April 18, 1966, the newspaper *Tsefang tsunpao* called on all supporters of Mao to take an active part in the "Cultural Revolution." On July 16 Mao, watched by reporters, took a swim in the Yantsi River to dispell rumours about him being in poor health. On July 28, just before the 11th Plenary Meeting of the Party's Central Committee was scheduled to open in Peking Mao together with his entourage took off for the capital, in military planes provided for them by Lin Piao, in order to see that the Plenum would

adopt decisions in favour of the "Cultural Revolution."

When it became clear that the task of smashing the party and people's committees was beyond the strength of the Red Guards, the Army was called in, in January 1967, to take a hand in the struggle against Mao's political opponents. The state and social system thus underwent a serious change. The socialist superstructure was destroyed and replaced by a military bureaucratic regime; all constitutional organs of power, party bodies, trade union, youth and other public organizations were dissolved. The working people were deprived of all the rights guaranteed by the Constitution.

Finally, after a hard struggle, 29 "revolutionary committees" were set up in the provinces, major cities and autonomous regions, 24 of them being headed by military men. These "committees" have ever since been beset by internal squabbles among Maoists contending for top places in these organizations. The masses, naturally, do not have a very high opinion of the "committees," which they did not elect, or of the military-bureaucratic measures which these "committees" are trying to enforce.

Unlike a democratically elected government, a militaristic authoritarian regime cannot be effective on the local level. The Maoists have found it difficult to form local "revolutionary committees" or make them function. Though the Party has been destroyed many true Communists are still resisting, and this influences the attitude of the masses. Repeated calls by *Jenmin jihpao* and *Hunchi* to intensify "the class struggle," i. e., struggle against those who do not support the

"Cultural Revolution," testify to the existence of strong opposition to Mao in the country. Thus one reads about appeals for fight against "parochialism," i. e., resistance to the Central Government by local authorities. In September 1969 the Maoists found it necessary to launch a country-wide campaign of "revolutionary criticism" under such slogans as: "Repell the attacks of class enemies," "Down with anarchism, cliquism and parochialism," and the like.

The Maoist "Cultural Revolution" has all but wrecked the socialist economic basis created in China during the years of the first five-year plan. Production and distribution have been put under military control; economy is managed with increasing reliance on coercive methods. The principle of planned and balanced economic development and the law of distribution according to labour have been discarded.

China's economy has been put on a war footing. Enormous sums are allocated for nuclear armaments which, for the reason that they are in the hands of militarists and bellicose politicians, can only increase the danger of a nuclear attack on China by imperialist powers. Militarization has also been introduced in the field of science. Ever larger portions of the national income are being redistributed in favour of parasitic military consumption at the expense of the broad masses. About half of the peacetime state budget actually goes for military purposes.

Militarization means, among other things, swelling of the number of soldiers in the country. This is exactly what is happening today in Maoist China. Soldiers who served their time are made to stay on; the Army is being run by former

hungweipings and tsaofans who had exhibited particular zeal in smashing democratic forces. Apart from the large regular Army, huge numbers of trained and armed troops appeared during the "Cultural Revolution"; their function was to keep the workers, peasants and intellectuals under control. A 100-million-strong people's militia undergoes constant training. Engels, speaking about the growing militarization in Prussia during the Franco-Prussian war, wrote in *Anti-Dühring*: "The army has become the main purpose of the state, and an end in itself; the peoples are there only to provide soldiers and feed them." This is true of Maoist China today.

No wonder that such vital branches of the national economy as industry, transport and agriculture have been stagnating for the last whole decade. Grain production, for instance, has shown no increase despite a large increase in population. In a number of fields production has even declined. According to respected economists, coal production in 1968 was about 200 million tons as against 348 million in 1959; cotton fabrics — 6,500 million metres against 7,500 million in 1959.

Militarization has disrupted China's economy, causing further lowering of living standards of the broad sections of the population. During the "Cultural Revolution" the wage-plus-bonus system was abandoned: the wages of workers and office employees have been cut by 10—15 per cent while the working day has been extended. In the countryside payment according to labour day* was also abolished. In towns food and consumer goods rations have been reduced.

* A unit for accounting the labour of collective-farm members.

Stagnation in industry has brought about unemployment. Thirteen to fourteen million young people who until recently made up the army of hungweipings are now at a loose end. They are demanding that the authorities take care of them; and there have been clashes between them and the soldiers who were ordered to keep them in check. Rioting by hungweipings from among the students are being put down by army units billeted at universities. On July 27, 1969, Peking newspapers marked the anniversary of the campaign for "re-educating intellectuals" — a campaign which was carried out with the use of similar methods and which started with the dispatch of a "soldier-worker brigade" to the Tsinhua Polytechnical Institute.

The authorities in Peking are now evicting from cities and towns, often with the help of troops, the unemployed, especially young people out of work, and large numbers of town dwellers of various social strata who do not share the views of the Mao group or are suspected of being disloyal to Peking. Over 20 million have been deported so far.

In relying on force the Maoists are putting themselves in opposition to all the main strata of Chinese society. Their policies have become deeply unpopular.

Since the Peking leadership started militarizing the country's economy, the countryside has turned into what it used to be for Chinese militarists of the past — their main object of plunder. Until recently Mao had exalted the peasantry, while ignoring the industrial proletariat. He theorized: "The Chinese revolution is virtually the peasants revolution... The strength of the

peasants constitutes the principal force of the Chinese revolution." (*On New Democracy*, 1940) Further "developing" Mao's idea Lin Piao applied it to the Third-World countries. "The village alone," he declared, "is the revolutionary base; by relying on the village revolutionaries are able to lead their countries to final victory" (*Long Live the Victory of People's War*, 1965). The Maoists are now taking a cautious attitude with respect to the countryside and have not tried to wage the "Cultural Revolution" there. It is interesting to note that the Maoists have failed to use the "revolutionary peasantry" as a shock force for breaking up "black opposition headquarters"; instead they made immature young people from cities and later on the army to carry out the act.

For fear that the village might rise in defence of the constitutional local authorities, the Maoists did not turn to the peasantry for support while setting up "revolutionary committees" in the provinces. And now, by finding army recruits from among city dwellers who had displayed particular enthusiasm for the "Cultural Revolution," the Maoists have no more need to call up young peasants to the army. Thus, the village is becoming more and more alien to the Maoists.

It is well known both in China and outside that in some provinces (Fukien, Kiangsi and others) detachments of peasants armed with lances and knives have appeared in towns, unexpectedly, ready to fight side by side with the workers against Maoist thugs. Such incidents frightened the Mao group, who began placing army cordons around cities and towns. According to reports in the hungweiping press, Maoist ideolo-

gist Ch'en Po-ta, in an address before the tsao-fans in Foochow, referred to peasants' marches to provincial centers and said that Mao's concept of "the village encircling the city" was inapplicable to modern China. Ch'en, however, failed to conceal his anxiety over the matter, noting that "when the masses got involved things become relatively serious."

The Chinese peasantry is deeply disappointed in the actions of the Mao group. The policy of "Three Red Banners" and particularly the suicidal policy of "People's Communes" have resulted in complete disorganization of agriculture and led to poverty and famine in the village. Yet, under the slogan: "Agriculture is the basis for the development of national economy," the Maoists continue to carry out their policy of total mobilization of the resources in the village for maintaining the army and the huge bureaucratic machine. Wielding military, political and economic control over the village the army requisitions food from the peasantry. Officers and soldiers search huts for grain and take away everything grown on tiny plots attached to the house.

The Maoist principle of "relying on one's own strength" means that the village can expect no help whatever from the state and the town in developing up-to-date farming. A whole campaign was launched in the central press for severing all remaining links between the village and the town. One of these links — trade — is rapidly declining. According to new principles proclaimed by Peking, trade links are the sole concern of the village, the town being freed of all responsibility in this important matter. Under the headline "Rely on One's Own Strength; Be

Thrifty and Economize; Be Prepared for War for the Sake of the People" *Jenmin jihpao* on June 5, 1969 published an article which contained the demand that medical service in the village be discontinued. "Peasants," said the newspaper, "must treat one another."

The Chinese village is sinking deeper and deeper into poverty and ignorance. There are no schools for the majority of the children living in the village. During the "Cultural Revolution" the schools lost their teachers, textbooks and educational aids. The entire village population, not excluding children, are forced to study Mao's thought. Peasants are made to undergo military training and drills after exhausting work in the fields.

No wonder the village is no longer regarded by Maoists as "good," as a force on which they could rely in encircling the restless town.

Mao has resorted to his favourite means of creating contradictions among the people. He tries to counterpose "reliable" peasants to "unreliable" peasants. Newspapers and radio have been talking about bitter class struggle in the village, which, as is well known, became united in cooperatives 15 years ago and was socially homogeneous. Now the Maoists are trying to isolate the former poor and middle* peasants from one another, but without much success. For neither empty promises, nor threatening demands, nor appeals from Peking can satisfy the peasant.

The Maoists then said that they were turning to the proletariat, to the "Great Proletarian Cul-

* A middle peasant is a peasant who possessed modest resources, but did not employ hired labour.

tural Revolution." And Mao presented himself as a proponent of the proletarian socialist revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat. "The working class runs everything," he proclaimed demagogically. Peking propaganda, however, added that by the dictatorship of the proletariat were meant Mao's leadership and the unquestionable authority of Mao's "thought." But the Maoists proved to be no more successful in enlisting the support of the working class than the peasantry and are now trying to split the working class.

Mao's demagogical act of turning to the proletariat was a logical outcome of his political adventurism. Mao understands well the mentality of the Chinese peasant. He undoubtedly knows what the current situation is in the village, that there is growing discontent among the peasantry, and feels that this might seriously jeopardize implementation of his policy and the militaristic experiments being carried out in the country's social and political life.

One can also safely assume that the army on which Mao leans is by no means a single, unified, military organization that will remain an absolutely dependable tool in his hands. After all, it is a socialist army in its origin, and it has deep roots among the people. Many military leaders who enjoyed the respect of the people rose against the use of army in launching anti-communist and anti-popular campaigns. The revolt of Chen Tsai-tao, former commander of the Hupei military district, against Mao in the summer of 1967 is just one example.

Generals who stood their ground have been made short work of. Up to 80 military leaders

are known to have been removed from their posts and subjected to persecution; many more have been arrested. All army political instructors were put through a strict screening process.

Special army units under Mao's direct control have been formed. The Peking unit which makes up nearly one-tenth of the entire People's Liberation Army is used by Maoists as a shield and a bludgeon. Headed by Lin Piao himself this unit guards Mao and his headquarters. In fact, its officers and soldiers have more power than top officials at ministries. Lin Piao, a man with a suspicious mind, spies on former Chinese marshals. With the exception of Lin Piao himself, all Chinese marshals have undergone "psychological check-ups" — processes involving harassment and humiliation by Red Guards in their wall-newspapers. Lin Piao has twice replaced the top personnel of the Army's General Staff. Its former chiefs Lo Juich'ing and Yang Ch'eng-wu have been arrested.

Traditions associated with guerrilla fights are being cultivated in the army. Here the principle of "leveling out on the lowest plane" is the basis of Mao's policy. Behind this lies Mao's fear of strong opponents as well as the tactics, used by Mao still at the Ching kang period, of courting riff-raff and making them into obedient servants and soldiers.

The abolition of military ranks was part of this policy. In doing this Mao not only took away from those whom he feared or did not like what are the formal symbols of authority and power, but also hoped to enhance his own prestige among the illiterate soldier masses. Mao himself has

never had formal military training or has held any military rank. The abolition of ranks cleared the way to top command posts for Mao's adherents and servants including illiterate hungweipings and tsaofans who are flooding the army.

Having turned the People's Liberation Army into a huge gendarmery the Maoists are now concentrating on tightening their control over the army. They are frightened lest the army should become split. They are still more terrified lest antagonism should develop between the army and the people, i. e., lest a civil war should break out. Mao's inspection tour of the country in the summer of 1967 was occasioned by threat of conflicts erupting between the army and the people in Nanking, Wuhan and other places. In his latest directives Mao calls for "an all-out strengthening of unity between the army and the population" — a task which can never be successfully carried out under militarization.

To secure a safe distance between the army and the people, and to relieve the army of complex political work, the Maoists had no alternative but to create a political party of their own — a purely militaristic organization bearing the name of the "Communist Party of China." That much struggle had gone on in this process was shown by the fact that the so-called 9th Congress of CPC was convened only after a purge in the army had been carried out. This explained why the convocation of the Congress was repeatedly postponed. It is not the Communist Party, but the army, Mao's servile tool, that is the cornerstone of the military bureaucratic dictatorship in China today.

III

If the 8th CPC Congress can be called a congress for industrialization and social transformations, the 9th Congress should be called a congress for militarization and anti-Sovietism. The militaristic and hegemonistic bias in Mao's thinking is totally incompatible with proletarian internationalism whose champion is the Soviet Union. Hence the rabid anti-Sovietism.

The spirit of militarism dominated the work of the Congress. In the three published Congress documents (the report, Party Rules and communique) Mao's military doctrine is hailed as a means of achieving political ends: "power comes from the barrel of a gun"; "he who controls the army possesses power," etc. The new Party Rules glorify armed struggle and speak about an outside threat coming not only from imperialism but from "modern revisionism" (meaning the Soviet Union). The communique of the Secretariat of the Congress Presidium calls on the people and the army to be prepared for an attack on China from outside. Lin Piao declared in his report that a major war may be expected in the near future in which conventional and even nuclear weapons will be used. "Be prepared for war and hunger" — this call of the Congress has been widely used for creating war hysteria and mobilizing resources through further lowering of the people's living standards.

The 9th Congress shows that the Chinese state run by Maoists is based on militarism and that this militarism is aimed against the Soviet Union. "The Army is the basic part of the state," Lin Piao said in the report. The newspaper *Tsefang*

tsunpao added that war was inevitable, while *Kuangming jihpao* stated that it would be a war against the Soviet Union.

The nomination of delegates and the election results at the Congress once again showed that the Maoists intend to rely on the military to keep them in power. Delegates in army uniform who had been handpicked by Mao and Lin Piao dominated the Congress. The military make up 54 per cent of the members in the newly elected Central Committee of the Communist Party, while out of 24 members and alternate members of the CC Political Bureau 15 hold top military posts. Most unusual of all is the fact that the names of Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao as party leaders are written into the new Party Rules. Lin Piao, who had on many occasions demonstrated his loyalty to the "leader," was properly rewarded: he was appointed Mao's deputy, and this was fixed in the Rules.

The increasing militarization of leading party bodies and "revolutionary committees" is breeding parasitism in Chinese society. The Maoists have published no data on the social and professional composition of the "delegates" to the 9th Congress. If they have, it would have been clear to everyone that the working class and the peasantry had been ignored. It is noteworthy that official greetings read out from the Congress' rostrum made no mention of the peasantry which constitutes the majority of the country's population.

The Congress did not touch on any problems of economic development and management. In fact, the Maoists do not have a concrete economic programme which would unite the people

with the central leadership. All that the Maoists had to say to the people was not that they should get down to work and improve living conditions, but that they should be ready for hunger and war.

Reports leaking out of China indicate that the broad masses are deeply opposed to the policies of the Peking militaristic government, that they are not at all interested in creating war hysteria, slandering the Soviet Union and staging anti-Soviet demonstrations and military provocations.

At the 9th Congress the thesis was put forward that a third world war is inevitable. This thesis follows from Mao's formula: "Either a war will bring about revolution or a revolution will prevent war." This is basically the neo-Trotskyite idea of permanent revolution; it contradicts the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence which may last over an extended period of time. The International Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties held in Moscow in June 1969 stated in its Document that "the policy of peaceful coexistence facilitates the positive solution of economic and social problems of the developing countries."

From the theoretical and historical point of view Mao's formula on war and revolution is crude and insignificant. There are two sides to the question of the effects which wars have on social development and revolutionary processes. On the one hand, wars did, in some instances, facilitate revolutions. But on the other hand, wars have always brought people suffering, destruction and famine. "Socialists," Lenin said, "have always condemned wars between nations as barbarous and brutal." (Coll. Works, Vol. 23,

p. 37)

This thesis was not forgotten even during the difficult years of the Civil War and War Communism in the Soviet Union. In February 1920 Lenin pointed out that the 9th Congress of the Russian Communist Party soon scheduled to open should consider the main question: how to go over "to the fight on the bloodless front, the front of labour, the front of the war against economic chaos, the war for the restoration, improvement, reorganization and development of Russia's entire economy." (*Coll. Works*, Vol. 30, p. 404)

The thermonuclear conflict which in his report Lin Piao considered inevitable, would bring untold suffering to the Chinese people. The size of the population of China and her military-economic potential cause the country to be particularly vulnerable to thermonuclear attacks. It seems clear that the present Chinese leadership should whole-heartedly support the principle of non-proliferation and ban of nuclear weapons. But it does not, despite the fact, of which it must be aware, that China's big cities and her coastal areas, where the overwhelming majority of the population lives, must appear, in the eyes of imperialists, to be eminently suitable targets for massive thermonuclear attacks.

Even a conventional, non-nuclear war would entail great casualties for the army. Modern army is a highly mechanized combat organization. In 1914 the mechanical power available per soldier was 0.3-0.4 hp, in 1918 — 15.-2.0 hp. By the beginning of World War II the figure rose in some armies to 10.0 hp. Now it is much higher. This extremely important factor in a conventional war is ignored by Lin Piao.

At present China can hardly compete with big imperialist powers in technical equipment of the army. In fact, the Chinese military leadership pays little attention to this problem, but emphasizes instead infantry, guerrilla warfare and close combat. No one can tell what would be the outcome of a war between China and the imperialist powers, should such a war break out. One thing is certain: China's losses would be much greater than the enemy's. The question, then, is: is it not a crime to train masses of young Chinese and condemn them to death in a major conflict which the Chinese leadership sees as inevitable?

Lenin pointed out that each epoch encompasses the sum total of various phenomena and wars, "typical and untypical, big and small, some peculiar to advanced countries, others to backward countries." (*Coll. Works*, Vol. 23, pp. 36-37) In the modern epoch there can be wars between the two systems — socialism and capitalism, wars of liberation against imperialist oppressors, civil wars in the capitalist countries, and colonial wars launched by imperialist powers. Military conflicts between imperialists are not excluded. Each type of war would have its own class character.

Peking militarists completely ignore the Marxist analysis concerning different types of war (whether predatory or just, whether they are wars of intervention, local wars, etc.). Maoists assert that the doctrine of "people's war" is universal; they hail the strategy and tactics of any war irrespective of its class nature and political aims.

Marxism-Leninism does not reject armed struggle as a means of combatting imperialism and

internal reaction and achieving national liberation and progress. As is known, the socialist countries and fraternal communist parties have consistently rendered aid to waging such a struggle. But as the balance of forces in the world is now changing more and more in favour of socialism, armed struggle is no longer the only alternative. The possibility of preventing wars depends, on the one hand, on the internal revolutionary processes in given countries and, on the other, on the growing world communist and working class movement, the increasing might of the Soviet Union and the world socialist community.

Progressive classes resort to wars only when their interests can be defended in no other way.

The adventuristic approach of the Maoists to the issue is harmful in that, unlike the Marxists, they regard war to be the normal state of affairs in international relations. The idea of "people's war" waged by the "world village" against the "world town," by coloured continents against white continents, very much resembles the idea of racial war whose purpose is the extermination of "inferior" peoples. The Maoist approach in no way differs from fascism.

The unity of the world's progressive forces, the world socialist system, the Soviet Union, and the liberation movements expanding in Africa, Asia and Latin America serve as an insurmountable barrier to subversive activities by militarists in China as well as in the capitalist countries. These progressive forces are guided not by the notion of "people's war" but by the laws of social development discovered by Marx, Engels and Lenin and tested by life. The inhumane, destructive

ideas of Mao Tse-tung are running into growing opposition in China.

The 9th Congress approved Mao's military and political platform, according to which China represents a force opposed to the socialist countries. In his report Lin Piao quoted Mao's words: "A new historical period has begun — a period of struggle against US imperialism and Soviet revisionism." In fact, the new Maoist party has proclaimed as its general line not struggle against imperialism but struggle against socialism, anti-Sovietism being the main principle of Peking's foreign policy. It also pledged to carry out a "relentless struggle" against "modern revisionism," meaning the Soviet Union, the socialist countries and all political parties and organizations in other countries which do not share Mao's ideas. The Chinese press is calling for stepping up the hate campaign against the USSR and the other socialist states, for whom the Maoists have invented a vicious name — "social-imperialist" countries.

From all three documents of the 9th Congress it is clear that the Congress's main task was to give legal status to Mao's global anti-communist and anti-Soviet strategy and endorse it as the basis for state and party policy. In his report Lin Piao spoke about "four main contradictions" in today's world and referred to the USSR in all four cases as the "negative" object of the contradictions; these contradictions supposedly "will lead to a revolution," and the process could be speeded up should there be a war. With no sense of shame the Maoist Congress declared the "social-imperialist" Soviet Union enemy of the oppressed nations and cynically placed it in op-

position to China and Albania. According to the Peking militarists, Albania is the one and only genuinely socialist state in the world.

The Maoist conception of the contradictions of our time clearly shows that Maoism represents an anti-Marxist and anti-Leninist trend, spear-headed against the international communist movement and anti-imperialist forces. It was pointed out at the 1969 International Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties that the basic contradictions between imperialism and socialism are deepening; that imperialism has not renounced armed struggle against the socialist states, against which its aggressive strategy is primarily aimed; that imperialism, whose citadel is the USA, is steadily intensifying the arms race, strengthening the military blocs created for aggression against the USSR and the other socialist countries, stepping up the ideological struggle against them, and trying to impede their economic advance.

It was emphasized at the same Conference that "the existing situation demands united actions of Communists and all other anti-imperialist forces so that maximum use may be made of the mounting possibilities for a broader offensive against imperialism, against the forces of reaction and war." It is unlikely, however, that the Peking militarists would fulfill this demand. Indeed, the international position they took at their 9th Congress, held on the eve of the Moscow Conference, was to block joint action by the Communist Parties. What the Maoists are trying to do is to weaken and disunite the three main revolutionary streams of present epoch: the world socialist system, the international working class and the na-

tional-liberation movement. At the 9th Congress the Chinese leaders showed willingness to assist imperialism in the drive against socialism and democracy in all parts of the world.

The lie invented by the Maoists about "a Soviet-American plot for achieving world supremacy" enables Peking to direct its propaganda and negative policy against the USSR rather than against the capitalist countries. This became particularly clear at the 9th Congress. In many instances the Mao group has come to time their anti-Soviet actions to the actions taken by the imperialist powers. Objectively, this leads to the formation in China of an anti-socialist front that is solidly behind imperialism's policy of war and aggression. The Peking line often dovetails with the schemes of US imperialism and plays into the hands of West German revanchists. They have eagerly applauded the actions of the Mao group, especially its armed provocations on the Soviet border. In its aims and methods Maoist policy towards the USSR and the other socialist countries does not differ from that of the imperialist powers who likewise regard the USSR as the main enemy.

The 9th Congress, in fact, did not subject to any criticism imperialism's policy of military and economic expansion. President Nixon was merely depicted as heir to an economy "bursting at all the seams." The policies approved at the Congress with respect to the socialist and capitalist countries show that China's foreign policy as a whole no longer rests on a class foundation and is emptied of all class content. The expected tirades against US imperialism were nothing but empty demagogy.

The Maoists are now deliberately inflating the border issue in order to justify their policy of growing militarization, which was approved at the Congress, and to make the population think that a war with the USSR is inevitable.

The Chinese armed attack on Damansky Island preceded the 9th Congress. Besides distorting facts the Chinese note officially claimed half a million square kilometres of territory that rightfully belonged to the Soviet Union. The territorial claims of the Mao group are absolutely groundless. Thus Peking has offered to "grant" the territory in question — Soviet territory — to the USSR on political terms which, if accepted, would mean betrayal of the vital interests of the Soviet people. Naturally, the Soviet Government will never agree to such arrogant terms. Therefore the Mao group will undoubtedly continue to make use of its provocative territorial claims for inciting nationalistic sentiments and militaristic feelings with respect to the USSR.

To repair the moral and political damage which they had suffered as a result of the Damansky incident, the Maoists came out at the Congress with a statement putting all the blame for the bloody clashes on the Soviet Union. They claimed that the Chinese Government had never tried to avoid talks proposed by the Soviet Government for settling the border conflict. The militaristic approach of the Chinese leadership to the border issue, which was officially approved at the Congress, indicates that Peking is not only trying to induce war psychosis in the China, but also to intimidate the Soviet people with hints of larger conflicts ahead.

Territorial claims have no place in relations between socialist countries. When such claims are made, they only prove that the leadership of one of the countries involved is no longer socialist. It is still more inconceivable that a socialist country would resort to military methods in resolving border disputes or any other issues with respect to another socialist country. Political acts of this kind are characteristic of imperialist circles.

Socialism is free from contradictions inherent in capitalism. Any differences arising among the socialist countries can and must be settled on the basis of proletarian internationalism, through comradely discussion and voluntary, fraternal cooperation. These differences must not be allowed to affect the united front of the socialist countries against imperialism. The Maoists, however, are attempting to undermine relations among the socialist countries, keep up and expand separatist nationalistic trends and anti-Soviet sentiments, weaken and disrupt friendly and allied contacts between the Soviet Union and the other socialist states, intimidate and blackmail them, and maintain and aggravate international tensions.

The positions taken by the Maoists at the 9th Congress will make the struggle for the unity of the international communist movement an increasingly difficult one. The threat to peace and socialism coming from the Mao group is growing. At the 1964 International Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties the splitting, militaristic policies of the Mao group were condemned. It was pointed out that by conducting these policies the Mao group was further isolating it-

self from the world forces of socialism and democracy.

The great Chinese people are going through a most trying period in their history. Owing to the treacherous, militaristic policies of the Mao group, China has become isolated from the world anti-imperialist movement. The expansionist strivings of the Maoists with respect to the USSR and the other socialist states have done tremendous damage to China; they have hampered socialist construction in the country and turned the country into an international scarecrow cutting her off from any contact with other socialist countries. By substituting military psychosis for the education of the masses, the Peking leadership is pushing the Chinese people off the socialist path and condemning them to remain in a state of ignorance and economic backwardness.

A pro-imperialist, militaristic policy such as that pursued by the Peking leadership in no way corresponds to the interests of the Chinese people; what the Chinese people need is constructive labour and not war.